

Turkey Between Europe and Asia

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Turkey in the 21st Century Opportunities, Challenges, Threats, Erik Cornell, 2001, Political Science, 183 pages. Answers the questions: what is the background to issues in external and internal politics? What is the Turks' opinion on European and Turkish identity? On Cyprus? On the role

Turkey's Evolving Dynamics Strategic Choices for U.S.-Turkey Relations, , 2009, History, 103 pages. Relations between the United States and Turkey stand at a critical juncture. Turkey is a key ally in the advancement of U.S. interests vis-à-vis the Middle East, Eurasia, and

Turkey's Relations With a Changing Europe , Meltem Muftuler-Bac, 1997, Political Science, 133 pages. Turkey's relations with a changing Europe is a thorough analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War on Turkey's internal and external policies. The author reconstructs

Pancha shila , A. V. Ramabrahmam, 1963, Political Science, 8 pages. .

A Journey Through Albania and Other Provinces of Turkey in Europe ..., Volume 1 , Baron John Cam Hobhouse Hobhouse, 1817, History, . .

The New Turkish Republic Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, Graham E. Fuller, 2008, Political Science, 196 pages. This timely work explores how, after a long period of isolation, Turkey is becoming a major player in Middle Eastern politics once again. In fact, by acting independently and

Contemporary international politics introductory readings, Bruce L. Sanders, Alan C. Durbin, 1971, Political Science, 430 pages. .

Turkey's New Geopolitics From the Balkans to Western China, Ian O. Lesser, Paul B. Henze, James F. Brown, 1993, History, 197 pages. Profoundly affected by the recent changes in geopolitics on its periphery, Turkey has the potential to exercise new foreign policy clout from the Balkans to Central Asia and

Turkey in post-Soviet Central Asia , Gareth M. Winrow, Former Soviet South Project, Russian and CIS Programme (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1995, , 53 pages. .

Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy , Rick Fawn, 2003, Political Science, 159 pages. This collection provides international perspectives on the evolution of Russia's foreign relations and analyses official Russian responses to major regional and international

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 , William M. Hale, 2000, Political Science, 375 pages. Since the

cold war ended, it has become an international field of study, with new material from China, the former Soviet Union and Europe. This volume takes stock of where

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The Emergence of Modern Turkey , Bernard Lewis, 2002, History, 524 pages. Written by renowned scholar Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey has established itself as the preferred one-volume history of modern Turkey. It covers the emergence

The History of Turkey , Douglas Arthur Howard, 2001, History, 241 pages. Discusses the political and economic aspects of each period as well as the social and cultural milieu, and includes a timeline, brief biographical notes on key players, and a

Turkey and the West , David Barchard, 1985, History, 100 pages. .

Strategic Challenges America's Global Security Agenda, Stephen J. Flanagan, James A. Schear, 2008, History, 415 pages. Experts analyze seven key security challenges.

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'From Madrid to Camp David: Europe, the US, and the Middle East Peace Process in the 1990s', Patrick MÅ¼ller and Claire Spencer in European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq (Eds Victor Mauer & Daniel MÅ¶ckli, CSS Studies in Security and International Relations, Routledge 2011

This 12-month project led by Dr Claire Spencer will analyse the nature of developments within the states most immediately chosen for enhanced cooperation with Europe (Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan) and explore the changing dynamics of economic and political relations within Europe's nearest neighbourhood, above all within and across the Mediterranean.

Are European policy establishments sufficiently equipped to manage requests at different levels from non-governmental and governmental actors in a context in which legitimacy and authority are now more openly contested, including in respect of the EU's own 'right' identify and work with local partners?

The EU's Foreign and Security Policy: Incremental Upgrading of Common Interests and the Effects of Institutionalised Cooperation. Presentation at the EU's Joint Decision Trap: Mechanisms across Policies (Institute for European Integration Research), Vienna/AUSTRIA [with Nicole Alecu de Flers and Laura Chappell].

The EU and Conflict Resolution through Economic Instruments – Routes of Influence and Effectiveness. Paper presented at the Conference on Strengthening the Forces of Moderation in the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Harry S. Truman Institute/ Netherlands Institute of International Relations), Jerusalem/ISRAEL, 28-30 June 2009.

In war things rarely run smoothly, but the tragedy of Syria lies as much in the fragility of the coalition supporting the rebels as in the inconclusiveness of the rebels' own political and military battles. Since the Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN in early 2011, there has been no single "international community" voice on Syria. On team A we have the US, EU, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Russia, China, Iran and sundry others make up team B. Far from resolving the crisis, these competing actors cancelled out each other's efforts over the ensuing two years. As the main instigators of Libya's liberation from Muammar Gaddafi, the French and British clearly want to do more than train rebel soldiers in Jordan, or increase humanitarian assistance to refugees. In pushing for arms to reach the FSA in Syria, however, they are failing to manage their own allies, much less the opposing team.

The Arab League, meeting this week, is once again calling for more robust UN action, but this reflects neither diplomatic realities nor developments on the ground. Journalists covering Syria from the inside have revealed how Turkey and the Gulf states are already training, funding and arming rebel groups; but from a Franco-British perspective, they are clearly the wrong ones. Last week's news that a low-level, chlorine-based chemical weapon may have been deployed from an area controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Islamist militia supported by Qatar, sits uneasily with the more secular FSA's appeals for hardware from the west.

So far, the US is sitting on the fence – the new secretary of state, John Kerry, having failed to convince President Obama that inserting more weaponry into Syria will save lives down the line. The alliance struck with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Syria remains circumstantial. It is not clear that all of team A wants the same thing. Opposing Iranian, or indeed Russian, influence in Syria is not the same thing as securing the best outcome for the Syrian people. With the shadow of 2003 Iraq hanging heavily over western intervention, which lacks domestic support in both Europe and the US, the next best options remain no-fly zones and humanitarian corridors. Neither is anywhere close to being legally viable or practical on the ground.

What worked in Libya in 2011 now looks like a fortuitous sleight of hand. Given the EU's tensions with Russia over Cyprus, the solid veto of China, and the regional activism of Qatar and Turkey, the Nato-led Libyan campaign may go down in history as one of the last actions of a consensus-based "international community". The closer the crisis, the more local agendas prevail. Whether this means the Gulf favouring jihadist strongmen over democracy, or Turkey backing some of Syria's ethnic and sectarian communities over others, it is not the Syrian people who will emerge victorious in any of the senses championed by the US and EU.

Relations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the United States date back to the earliest days of U.S. history. On December 20, 1777, Morocco became the first country to give a naval salute to the new nation.[1] Morocco remains one of America's oldest and closest allies in the Middle East and North Africa, a status affirmed by Morocco's zero-tolerance policy towards al-Qaeda and their affiliated groups. Morocco also assisted the U.S. CIA with questioning al-Qaeda members captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Somalia and elsewhere during the administration of George W. Bush, who designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

Formal U.S. relations with Morocco date from 1787 when the United States Congress ratified a Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the two nations.[2] Renegotiated in 1836, the treaty is still in force, constituting the longest unbroken treaty relationship in U.S. history, and Tangier is home to the oldest U.S. diplomatic property in the world. Now a museum, the Tangier American Legation Museum is also the only building outside of the U.S. that is now a National Historic Landmark.[3]

The United States government ratified a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco which took effect January 1, 2006. Originally passed in June 2004, the Morocco – United States Free Trade Agreement passed both houses of the U.S. legislative branch overwhelmingly. The House of Representatives passed the bill 323-99, while the U.S. Senate provided unanimous consent. On

August 17, 2004 the bill became U.S. Public Law number: 108-302[4] According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) the FTA “eliminates duties on more than 95 percent of all goods and services.”[5] The agreement also committed Morocco to increase regulatory transparency and protect intellectual property rights. The United States continues to assist Morocco in meeting these commitments by providing targeted technical assistance and support.[5] Morocco is also one of the few countries in Africa to extend visa-free travel to American citizens.

Since passing the Moroccan FTA, Morocco has become the United States’ 67th largest export market, totaling \$1.5 billion. Likewise, U.S. imports from Morocco increased 44.1 percent to \$879 million. These increases have led U.S. foreign direct investment in Morocco to reach \$238 million in 2007 (latest data).[6]

Since Morocco is a stable, comparatively moderate Arab Muslim nation, Morocco and the United States share important interests in the Middle East. Accordingly, U.S. policy toward Morocco seeks sustained and strong engagement and identifies priorities of economic, social, and political reform; conflict resolution; counterterrorism/security cooperation; and public outreach. In August 2007, the U.S. and Morocco signed a Millennium Challenge Compact totaling \$697.5 million to be paid out over five years. The Compact was designed to stimulate economic growth by increasing productivity and improving employment in high-potential sectors, such as artisanal crafts and fishing.[7]

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its predecessor agencies have managed an active and effective assistance program in Morocco since 1953, exceeding \$2 billion over its lifetime. The amount of USAID assistance to Morocco in FY 2009 was \$18 million, with an estimated \$24.5 million allotted for FY 2010. USAID’s current multi-sectoral strategy (2009–2013) consists of three strategic objectives in creating more opportunities for trade and investment, basic education and workforce training, and government responsiveness to citizen needs.[7]

The Peace Corps has been active in Morocco for more than 40 years, with the first group of 53 volunteers arriving in the country in 1963. Since that time, nearly 4,000 volunteers have served in Morocco in a variety of capacities including lab technology, urban development, commercial development, education, rural water supply, small business development, beekeeping, and English language training. In 2009, 254 volunteers served in Morocco, working in four sectors: health, youth development, small business, and the environment.[7] In a statement during a session of the U.S. Senate on March 3, 2010, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) discussed the value of Peace Corps broadly and specifically of the Moroccan Peace Corps program. He highlighted several programs, and said that a group of Moroccan men he met while in Morocco “...credit the Peace Corps program for empowering them and building their language skills.” He further stated, “I credit the Peace Corps for something even greater – forging international understanding.”[8] He also explained that U.S. Peace Corps efforts in Morocco have aided in decreasing extremist recruitment in Morocco.[8]

Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ibn Abdullah actively sought to have an American diplomat negotiate a formal treaty. Finally, Thomas Barclay, the American consul in France, arrived in Morocco in 1786. There he quickly negotiated the Moroccan-American Treaty of Friendship which was signed later that year in Europe by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson and ratified by Congress in July 1787.[10]

During the American Civil War, Morocco reaffirmed its diplomatic alliance with the United States. Morocco also became the scene of a colorful foreign relations and political warfare episode involving the Kingdom of Morocco, the United States of America, the Confederate States of America, France, and Great Britain.

In 1862 Confederate diplomats Henry Myers and Tom Tate Tunstall were arrested outside the American Consulate in Tangier after making disparaging remarks about the United States and its flag. American consul, James De Long overheard their jeers and asked Moroccan police to seize the men. When word reached Confederate Admiral Raphael Semmes who was acting as the

Confederate diplomat in the area, he sent out dispatches to as many neutral diplomats as he had contact with, including the British Consul to Morocco, John Drummond Hay. Semmes asked Hay to get involved and encourage Morocco to release the prisoners, to which Hay responded that he could only convey the message but not offer any recommendation for actions, as offering a recommendation would violate Britain's terms of neutrality. Semmes tried a similar tactic with the French consul, but without success.

Eventually, European citizens living in Morocco rallied outside the American consulate demanding the prisoners' release. During the heat of the protest, American Lt. Commander Josiah Creesey drew his sword, which caused the mob to throw rocks. After the episode, the Moroccan government sent official word to Semmes that they could not meet with him to discuss the situation, because the two nations did not have formal diplomatic relations. Eventually, the Union officials ordered the two prisoners be sent to Fort Warren prison in Boston by way of Cadiz, Spain. Only after the French intervened while the ship was docked in Cadiz did President Abraham Lincoln issue an official order to release the prisoners.[11]

As a result of the affair, Lincoln withdrew consul De Long. Having been irritated by Morocco's response, the Confederate States were never able to recover and manage relations with Morocco. In 1863, the King of Morocco released an official order stating in part: "... the Confederate States of America are fighting the government with whom we are in friendship and good relations... if any vessel of the so-called Confederate states enters your port, it shall not be received, but you must order it away on pain of seizure; and you will act on this subject in cooperation with the United States...."[12]

At the end of the Civil War, the first international convention ever signed by the United States, the 1865 Sparteil Lighthouse Treaty, dealt with a navigational aid erected on the Moroccan side of the Strait of Gibraltar. The Treaty, ratified by Morocco, President Andrew Johnson, and nine European heads of state, granted neutrality to the lighthouse, with the condition that the ten naval powers signing the agreement assumed responsibility for its maintenance.

Around the turn of the 20th century, as European colonizers gazed hungrily at Morocco's resources and strategically located harbors, the United States strongly defended the Kingdom's right to its continued sovereignty at the Conference of Madrid (1880), and again at the Algeciras Conference in 1906. In fact, the European powers were edging towards engaging in a continental war because of Morocco in 1905. President Theodore Roosevelt played an important role in settling the affair during the 1906 Algeciras Conference. President Roosevelt offered a compromise plan which the European powers accepted. The proposal granted Morocco a greater deal of autonomy and allowed for all European nations to trade with Morocco.[13]

In 1912, after Morocco became a protectorate of Spain and France because of Moroccan leadership mismanagement, American diplomats called upon the European powers to exercise colonial rule that guaranteed racial and religious tolerance: In short, the U.S. Consul in Tanger declared, "fair play is what the United States asks for Morocco and all interested parties." [citation needed]

With France occupied by the Nazis during World War II, colonial French Morocco initially sided with the Axis Powers. When the Allies invaded Morocco on November 8, 1942, Moroccan defenders quickly yielded to the American and British invaders. Shortly after Morocco surrendered, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a message to Morocco's King, H.E. Mohammed V, commending him on the "admirable spirit of cooperation that is animating you and your people in their relationships with the forces of my country. Our victory over the Germans will, I know, inaugurate a period of peace and prosperity, during which the Moroccan and French people of North Africa will flourish and thrive in a manner that befits its glorious past." [citation needed]

In what was to be the most pivotal meeting of Allied leaders during World War II, President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Free French commander General Charles De Gaulle met for four days in the Casablanca suburb of Anfa in January 1943 to discuss the war. During the Anfa Conference, the Allies agreed that the only acceptable outcome of the conflict was

the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis forces. President Roosevelt also conferred privately with King Mohammed V to assure him that the United States would support Morocco's quest for independence from France.[14]

Since gaining independence from France on March 2, 1956, Morocco has been committed to nurturing a special relationship with the United States, based on both nations' historical ties and on a succession of personal friendships between Mohammed V, Hassan II, and now Mohammed VI and their American Presidential counterparts.[15] Morocco has also played a critical role in explaining the larger role of Arab policy to the United States. This was particularly true under the reign of King Hassan II.[16]

After Morocco gained independence, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent a congratulatory message to King Mohammed V: "My government renews its wishes for the peace and prosperity of Morocco, and expresses its gratification that Morocco has freely chosen, as a sovereign nation, to continue in the path of its traditional friendships." [citation needed]

In 1961, King Hassan II, Mohammed V's successor, made the first of several diplomatic visits to the United States to confer with President John F. Kennedy. King Hassan II would later journey to Washington to meet Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton.

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